(a) In general
The following security requirements shall apply with respect to United States diplomatic facilities and specified personnel:
(1) Threat assessment
(A) Emergency Action Plan
The Emergency Action Plan (EAP) of each United States mission shall address the threat of large explosive attacks from vehicles and from complex attacks (as such term is defined in section 4866 of this title), and the safety of employees during such an explosive attack or such a complex attack. Such plan shall be reviewed and updated annually.
(B) Security Environment Threat List
The Security Environment Threat List shall contain a section that addresses potential acts of international terrorism against United States diplomatic facilities based on threat identification criteria that emphasize the threat of transnational terrorism and include the local security environment, host government support, and other relevant factors such as cultural realities. Such plan shall be reviewed and updated every six months.
(2) Site selection
(A) In general
In selecting a site for any new United States diplomatic facility abroad, the Secretary shall ensure that all United States Government personnel at the post (except those under the command of an area military commander) will be located on the site.
(B) Waiver authority
(i) In general
Subject to clause (ii), the Secretary of State may waive subparagraph (A) if the Secretary, together with the head of each agency employing personnel that would not be located at the site, determine that security considerations permit and it is in the national interest of the United States.
(ii) Chancery or consulate building
(I) Authority not delegable
The Secretary may not delegate the waiver authority under clause (i) with respect to a chancery or consulate building.
(II) Congressional notification
Not less than 15 days prior to implementing the waiver authority under clause (i) with respect to a chancery or consulate building, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the waiver and the reasons for the determination.
(iii) Report to Congress
The Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report of all waivers under this subparagraph.
(3) Perimeter distance
(A) Requirement
Each newly acquired United States diplomatic facility shall be sited not less than 100 feet from the perimeter of the property on which the facility is to be situated.
(B) Waiver authority
(i) In general
Subject to clause (ii), the Secretary of State may waive subparagraph (A) if the Secretary determines that security considerations permit and it is in the national interest of the United States.
(ii) Chancery or consulate building
(I) Authority not delegable
The Secretary may not delegate the waiver authority under clause (i) with respect to a chancery or consulate building.
(II) Congressional notification
Not less than 15 days prior to implementing the waiver authority under subparagraph (A) with respect to a chancery or consulate building, the Secretary shall notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the waiver and the reasons for the determination.
(iii) Report to Congress
The Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report of all waivers under this subparagraph.
(4) Crisis management training
(A) Training of headquarters staff
The appropriate personnel of the Department of State headquarters staff shall undertake crisis management training for mass casualty and mass destruction incidents relating to diplomatic facilities for the purpose of bringing about a rapid response to such incidents from Department of State headquarters in Washington, D.C.
(B) Training of personnel abroad
A program of appropriate instruction in crisis management shall be provided to personnel at United States diplomatic facilities abroad at least on an annual basis.
(5) Diplomatic security training
Not later than six months after November 29, 1999, the Secretary of State shall—
(A) develop annual physical fitness standards for all diplomatic security agents to ensure that the agents are prepared to carry out all of their official responsibilities; and
(B) provide for an independent evaluation by an outside entity of the overall adequacy of current new agent, in-service, and management training programs to prepare agents to carry out the full scope of diplomatic security responsibilities, including preventing attacks on United States personnel and facilities.
(6) State Department support
(A) Foreign Emergency Support Team
The Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) of the Department of State shall receive sufficient support from the Department, including—
(i) conducting routine training exercises of the FEST;
(ii) providing personnel identified to serve on the FEST as a collateral duty;
(iii) providing personnel to assist in activities such as security, medical relief, public affairs, engineering, and building safety; and
(iv) providing such additional support as may be necessary to enable the FEST to provide support in a post-crisis environment involving mass casualties and physical damage.
(B) FEST aircraft
(i) Replacement aircraft
The President shall develop a plan to replace on a priority basis the current FEST aircraft funded by the Department of Defense with a dedicated, capable, and reliable replacement aircraft and backup aircraft to be operated and maintained by the Department of Defense.
(ii) Report
Not later than 60 days after November 29, 1999, the President shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the aircraft selected pursuant to clause (i) and the arrangements for the funding, operation, and maintenance of such aircraft.
(iii) Authority to lease aircraft to respond to a terrorist attack abroad
Subject to the availability of appropriations, when the Attorney General of the Department of Justice exercises the Attorney General's authority to lease commercial aircraft to transport equipment and personnel in response to a terrorist attack abroad if there have been reasonable efforts to obtain appropriate Department of Defense aircraft and such aircraft are unavailable, the Attorney General shall have the authority to obtain indemnification insurance or guarantees if necessary and appropriate.
(7) Rapid response procedures
The Secretary of State shall enter into a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Defense setting out rapid response procedures for mobilization of personnel and equipment of their respective departments to provide more effective assistance in times of emergency with respect to United States diplomatic facilities, including at high risk, high threat posts (as such term is defined in section 4803 of this title), including options for the deployment of additional military personnel or equipment to bolster security and rapid deployment of armed or surveillance assets in response to an attack.
(8) Storage of emergency equipment and records
All United States diplomatic facilities shall have emergency equipment and records required in case of an emergency situation stored at an off-site facility.
(b) Statutory construction
Nothing in this section alters or amends existing security requirements not addressed by this section.
Codification
Section was enacted as part of the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, and also as part of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, and not as part of the Diplomatic Security Act which comprises this chapter.
Amendments
2016—Subsec. (a)(1)(A). Pub. L. 114–323, §102(1), inserted "and from complex attacks (as such term is defined in section 4866 of this title)," after "attacks from vehicles" and "or such a complex attack" after "an explosive attack".
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 114–323, §102(2), inserted before period at end ", including at high risk, high threat posts (as such term is defined in section 4803 of this title), including options for the deployment of additional military personnel or equipment to bolster security and rapid deployment of armed or surveillance assets in response to an attack".
Delegation of Authority
Memorandum of President of the United States, July 17, 2000, 65 F.R. 45511, provided:
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, I hereby delegate to the Secretary of Defense the responsibility of the President, under section 606 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (Public Law 106–113) [22 U.S.C. 4865], to submit the required report to the Congress.
You are hereby authorized and directed to publish this delegation in the Federal Register.
William J. Clinton.
Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States Diplomatic Facilities in Cuba
Pub. L. 114–113, div. M, title V, §513, Dec. 18, 2015, 129 Stat. 2926, provided that:
"(a)
"(b)
"(1) determines that such waiver is in the national security interest of the United States; and
"(2) submits a written justification for such waiver to the appropriate congressional committees not later than 90 days before exercising such waiver.
"(c)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives];
"(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives."
Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities in United States Diplomatic Facilities in the Russian Federation and Adjacent Countries
Pub. L. 113–293, title III, §314, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 4002, provided that:
"(a)
"(b)
"(c)
"(1) the congressional intelligence committees [Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives];
"(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
"(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives."
Capital Security Cost Sharing
Pub. L. 109–364, div. A, title III, §357, Oct. 17, 2006, 120 Stat. 2163, as amended by Pub. L. 115–91, div. A, title X, §1051(l), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1564, provided that:
"(a)
"(b)
Findings
Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, §1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VI, §602], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–451, provided that: "Congress makes the following findings:
"(1) On August 7, 1998, the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were destroyed by simultaneously exploding bombs. The resulting explosions killed 220 persons and injured more than 4,000 others. Twelve Americans and 40 Kenyan and Tanzanian employees of the United States Foreign Service were killed in the attack.
"(2) The United States personnel in both Dar es Salaam and Nairobi showed leadership and personal courage in their response to the attacks. Despite the havoc wreaked upon the embassies, staff in both embassies provided rapid response in locating and rescuing victims, providing emergency assistance, and quickly restoring embassy operations during a crisis.
"(3) The bombs are believed to have been set by individuals associated with Osama bin Laden, leader of a known transnational terrorist organization. In February 1998, bin Laden issued a directive to his followers that called for attacks against United States interests anywhere in the world.
"(4) Threats continue to be made against United States diplomatic facilities.
"(5) Accountability Review Boards were convened following the bombings, as required by Public Law 99–399 [see Tables for classification], chaired by Admiral William J. Crowe, United States Navy (Ret.) (in this section referred to as the 'Crowe panels').
"(6) The conclusions of the Crowe panels were strikingly similar to those stated by the Commission chaired by Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, which issued an extensive embassy security report in 1985.
"(7) The Crowe panels issued a report setting out many problems with security at United States diplomatic facilities, in particular the following:
"(A) The United States Government has devoted inadequate resources to security against terrorist attacks.
"(B) The United States Government places too low a priority on security concerns.
"(8) The result has been a failure to take adequate steps to prevent tragedies such as the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.
"(9) The Crowe panels found that there was an institutional failure on the part of the Department of State to recognize threats posed by transnational terrorism and vehicular bombs.
"(10) Responsibility for ensuring adequate resources for security programs is widely shared throughout the United States Government, including Congress. Unless the vulnerabilities identified by the Crowe panels are addressed in a sustained and financially realistic manner, the lives and safety of United States employees in diplomatic facilities will continue to be at risk from further terrorist attacks.
"(11) Although service in the Foreign Service or other United States Government positions abroad can never be completely without risk, the United States Government must take all reasonable steps to minimize security risks."
Authorizations of Appropriations
Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, §1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VI, §604], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–453, as amended by Pub. L. 107–228, div. A, title I, §111(a)(3)(B), Sept. 30, 2002, 116 Stat. 1356; Pub. L. 108–447, div. B, title VI, §629, Dec. 8, 2004, 118 Stat. 2920; Pub. L. 112–74, div. I, title VII, §7004(e), Dec. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 1194; Pub. L. 114–323, title I, §111(b), Dec. 16, 2016, 130 Stat. 1910, provided that:
"(a)
"(1) for fiscal year 2000, $900,000,000;
"(2) for fiscal year 2001, $900,000,000;
"(3) for fiscal year 2002, $900,000,000;
"(4) for fiscal year 2003, $1,000,000,000; and
"(5) for fiscal year 2004, $900,000,000.
"(b)
"(1) the acquisition of United States diplomatic facilities and, if necessary, any residences or other structures located in close physical proximity to such facilities, or
"(2) the provision of major security enhancements to United States diplomatic facilities,
to the extent necessary to bring the United States Government into compliance with all requirements applicable to the security of United States diplomatic facilities, including the relevant requirements set forth in section 606 [22 U.S.C. 4865].
"(c)
"(d)
"(e)
"(1)
"(2)
"(3)
Obligations and Expenditures
Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, §1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VI, §605], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–453, as amended by Pub. L. 112–74, div. I, title VII, §7034(n), Dec. 23, 2011, 125 Stat. 1217, provided that:
"(a)
"(1)
"(2)
"(A)
"(B)
"(b)
Definitions
For definitions of the terms "Secretary" and "appropriate congressional committees" used in this section and in section 1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VI, §605] of Pub. L. 106–113, set out as a note above, see section 1000(a)(7) [§3] of Pub. L. 106–113, set out as a note under section 2651 of this title.
Pub. L. 106–113, div. B, §1000(a)(7) [div. A, title VI, §603], Nov. 29, 1999, 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–452, provided that: "In this title [enacting this section, amending section 4831 of this title, and enacting provisions set out as notes above], the terms 'United States diplomatic facility' and 'diplomatic facility' mean any chancery, consulate, or other office notified to the host government as diplomatic or consular premises in accordance with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, or otherwise subject to a publicly available bilateral agreement with the host government (contained in the records of the United States Department of State) that recognizes the official status of the United States Government personnel present at the facility."
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