(a) This part applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard by agreement with the Department of Homeland Security when it is not operating as a Service of the Department of the Navy), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as “the DoD Components”). The term “Military Services,” as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

(b) Coast Guard. The Coast Guard ordinarily operates as a separate branch of the Armed Forces in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, upon Presidential Directive, the Coast Guard operates as a Service within the Department of the Navy and becomes part of the Department of Defense. By agreement with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, when the Coast Guard is operating as a separate Service within the DHS, this part shall apply to the Coast Guard to the extent permitted by the Act. Whether a provision of this Instruction applies to a Coast Guard case is determined by whether the Coast Guard is operating as a Service in the DHS or as a Service within the Department of the Navy.

(c) While some Federal criminal statutes are expressly or implicitly extraterritorial, many acts described therein are criminal only if they are committed within “the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” or if they affect interstate or foreign commerce. Therefore, in most instances, Federal criminal jurisdiction ends at the nation's borders. State criminal jurisdiction, likewise, normally ends at the boundaries of each State. Because of these limitations, acts committed by military personnel, former service members, and civilians employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces in foreign countries, which would be crimes if committed in the U.S., often do not violate either Federal or State criminal law. Similarly, civilians are generally not subject to prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), unless Congress had declared a “time of war” when the acts were committed. As a result, these acts are crimes, and therefore criminally punishable, only under the law of the foreign country in which they occurred. See section 2 of Report Accompanying the Act (Report to Accompany H.R. 3380, House of Representatives Report 106-778, July 20, 2000 hereafter referred to as “the Report Accompanying the Act”). While the U.S. could impose administrative discipline for such actions, the Act and this part are intended to address the jurisdictional gap with respect to criminal sanctions.

(d) Nothing in this part may be construed to deprive a court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or the law of war may be tried by court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal (Section 3261(c) of title 18). In some cases, conduct that violates section 3261(a) of the Act may also violate the UCMJ, or the law of war generally. Therefore, for military personnel, military authorities would have concurrent jurisdiction with a U.S. District Court to try the offense. The Act was not intended to divest the military of jurisdiction and recognizes the predominant interest of the military in disciplining its service members, while still allowing for the prosecution of members of the Armed Forces with non-military co-defendants in a U.S. District Court under section 3261(d) of the Act.

(e) This part, including its enclosures, is intended exclusively for the guidance of military personnel and civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and of the United States Coast Guard by agreement with the Department of Homeland Security. Nothing contained herein creates or extends any right, privilege, or benefit to any person or entity. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).