Conditional Payment of Fee or Profit—Protection of Worker Safety and Health (DEC 2010)

(a) General.

(1) The payment of fee or profit (i.e., award fee, fixed fee, and incentive fee or profit) under this contract is dependent upon the Contractor's compliance with the terms and conditions of this contract relating to the protection of worker safety and health (WS&H), including compliance with applicable law, regulation, and DOE directives. The term “Contractor” as used in this clause to address failure to comply shall mean “Contractor or Contractor employee.”

(2) In addition to other remedies available to the Federal Government, if the Contractor fails to comply with the terms and conditions of this contract relating to the protection of worker safety and health, the Contracting Officer may unilaterally reduce the amount of fee or profit that is otherwise payable to the Contractor in accordance with the terms and conditions of this clause.

(3) Any reduction in the amount of fee or profit earned by the Contractor will be determined by the severity of the Contractor's failure to comply with contract terms and conditions relating to worker safety and health pursuant to the degrees specified in paragraph (c) of this clause.

(b) Reduction amount.

(1) If in any period (see paragraph (b)(2) of this clause) it is found that the Contractor has failed to comply with contract terms and conditions relating to the protection of worker safety and health, the Contractor's fee or profit of the period may be reduced. Such reduction shall not be less than 26% nor greater than 100% of the total fee or profit earned for a first degree performance failure, not less than 11% nor greater than 25% for a second degree performance failure, and up to 10% for a third degree performance failure. The Contracting Officer must consider mitigating factors that may warrant a reduction below the specified range (see 48 CFR 923.7001(b)). The mitigating factors include, but are not limited to, the following:

(i) Degree of control the Contractor had over the event or incident.

(ii) Efforts the Contractor had made to anticipate and mitigate the possibility of the event in advance.

(iii) Contractor self-identification and response to the event to mitigate impacts and recurrence.

(iv) General status (trend and absolute performance) of protecting WS&H and compliance in related areas.

(v) Contractor demonstration to the Contracting Officer's satisfaction that the principles of industrial WS&H standards are routinely practiced (e.g., Voluntary Protection Program Star Status).

(vi) Event caused by “Good Samaritan” act by the Contractor (e.g., offsite emergency response).

(vii) Contractor demonstration that a performance measurement system is routinely used to improve and maintain WS&H performance (including effective resource allocation) and to support DOE corporate decision-making (e.g., policy, WS&H programs).

(viii) Contractor demonstration that an Operating Experience and Feedback Program is functioning that demonstrably affects continuous improvement in WS&H by use of lessons-learned and best practices inter- and intra-DOE sites.

(2)

(i) Except in the case of performance based firm-fixed-price contracts (see paragraph (b)(3) below), the Contracting Officer, for purposes of this clause, will at the time of contract award, or as soon as practicable thereafter, allocate the total amount of fee or profit that is available under this contract to equal periods of [insert 6 or 12] months to run sequentially for the entire term of the contract (i.e., from the effective date of the contract to the expiration date of the contract, including all options). The amount of fee or profit to be allocated to each period shall be equal to the average monthly fee or profit that is available or otherwise payable during the entire term of the contract, multiplied by the number of months established above for each period.

(ii) Under this clause, the total amount of fee or profit that is subject to reduction in a period in which a performance failure occurs, in combination with any reduction made under any other clause in the contract that provides for a reduction to the fee or profit, shall not exceed the amount of fee or profit that is earned by the Contractor in the period established pursuant to paragraph (b)(2)(i) of this clause.

(3) For performance-based firm-fixed-price contracts, the Contracting Officer will at the time of contract award include negative monetary incentives in the contract for contractor violations relating to the protection of worker safety and health.

(c) Protection of worker safety and health. Performance failures occur if the Contractor does not comply with the contract's WS&H terms and conditions, which may be included in the DOE approved contractor Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS). The degrees of performance failure under which reductions of fee or profit will be determined are:

(1) First Degree: Performance failures that are most adverse to WS&H or could threaten the successful completion of a program or project. For contracts including ISMS requirements, failure to develop and obtain required DOE approval of WS&H aspects of an ISMS is considered first degree. The Government will perform necessary review of the ISMS in a timely manner and will not unreasonably withhold approval of the WS&H aspects of the Contractor's ISMS. The following performance failures or performance failures of similar import will be deemed first degree:

(i) Type A accident (defined in DOE Order 225.1A, Accident Investigations, or its successor).

(ii) Two Second Degree performance failures during an evaluation period.

(2) Second Degree: Performance failures that are significantly adverse to WS&H. They include failures to comply with approved WS&H aspects of an ISMS that result in an actual injury, exposure, or exceedence that occurred or nearly occurred but had minor practical long-term health consequences. The following performance failures or performance failures of similar import will be considered second degree:

(i) Type B accident (defined in DOE Order 225.1A, Accident Investigations, or its successor).

(ii) Non-compliance with approved WS&H aspects of an ISMS that results in a near miss of a Type A or B accident. A near miss is a situation in which an inappropriate action occurs, or a necessary action is omitted, but does not result in an adverse effect.

(iii) Failure to mitigate or notify DOE of an imminent danger situation after discovery, where such notification is a requirement of the contract.

(3) Third Degree: Performance failures that reflect a lack of focus on improving WS&H. They include failures to comply with approved WS&H aspects of an ISMS that result in potential breakdown of the Contractor's WS&H system. The following performance failures or performance failures of similar import will be considered third degree:

(i) Failure to implement effective corrective actions to address deficiencies/non-compliance documented through external (e.g., Federal) oversight and/or reported per DOE Manual 231.1-2, Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information, or its successor, requirements, or internal oversight of DOE Order 470.2B, Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance Program, or its successor, requirements.

(ii) Multiple similar non-compliances identified by external (e.g., Federal) oversight that in aggregate indicate a significant WS&H system breakdown.

(iii) Non-compliances that either have, or may have, significant negative impacts to workers that indicate a significant WS&H system breakdown.

(iv) Failure to notify DOE upon discovery of events or conditions where notification is required by the terms and conditions of the contract.